Une questio de vie ou de mort!  Jugez vous memes. Dans son livre Mein Kampf, hitler le maitre inconteste de l’Allemangne actuelle,…

One sheet/leaflet, printed on one side only. 10”x 8”. Ca. Mid 1930’s?   $150

This is a leaflet or broadsheet making the point that France and Germany are mortal enemies—it attracts attention by boldly stating in the first line that the situation/question is a matter of life and death. .(This is more of a statement than an interrogatory, as there are no questions on the sheet.) The writer makes the point clearly with a long extract from Mein Kampf:

“Il faut qu’on le scahe bien l’ennemi mortel le plus inexorable du peuple allemand est et demeure la France …” (“We have to be clear about the most inexorable mortal enemy of the German people is and remains France…”) Not only is France the mortal enemy, but it and its people should be destroyed in the coming great decisive battle (“derniere lutte decisive”).

And so France is warned by Hitler himself. The author of the leaflet does have a solution, and it involves solidarity and strength from all of the people of France regardless of the sort of government you support, if you are on the Left or Right. (“Ainsi la France est avwertie par Hitler lui-meme: quel que soit son gouvernement—de gauche ou de droite—la France est menacee d’une aggression allemande!”)

The concolusion is simple: “We will make a strong attack, we will be respected, we will be strong.”

(“Faibles, nous serons attaques forts, nous serons respectes soyons forts.”) Come 1940, though…

Three opinion collection documents, printed

• 1) Attitudes Toward Japan, Digest of Public Opinion Surveys.  11″x 8.5″, offset printed from typed originals. 2 lvs. Stapled. 1944.
• 2) Expert Opinion on Post-War Treatment of Japan. 11″x 8.5″, offset printed from typed originals. 4 lvs. Stapled. 1944.
• 3)  The Treatment of Japan.   11″x 8.5″, offset printed from typed originals. 4 lvs. Stapled. 1944.

The three (all quite scarce): SOLD

I uncovered a few interesting documents this morning from The American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations (in 1944 at the address 744 Jackson Place, N.W., D.C.) relating to collecting opinions on Japan and the Japanese, right at the height of the war.   And this is what the American Council was doing–prep work to assess the extent of public opinion on the treatment of Japan post-war, which entailed reviewing existing polling data (from Gallup) was well as conducting their own original research.The “first” issue (so far as I can determine)  was perhaps the most aggressive:

Is Japan incurably warlike?

The question was asked of an undefined group over three periods of time  (February 1942 to June 1943) for both Japan and Germany, the statements the respondents having to choose from being: “always want war”, “too easily led” and “do not like war” at three different times, from February 1942 to June 1943.  From Feb ’42 to June ’43, people’s opinions that the Japanese “always want war” went up from 48% to 62%, while for the same time the same question regarding the Germans stayed about the same, 22%.  The Gallup Poll for June 1943 reported that for 75% of the respondents only 8% of the folks thought that “we can get along” with the Japanese, while 67% favored our chances with the Germans. 

Get along with them or not, or feeling that they are war-like or not, had little to do with the opinions of people (reported by the National Opinion research Center, August 1942) who thought that reparations should be paid, and paid hard, by the Axis powers across the board, “as much as it is possible to get out of the Axis countries, even if it breaks them”.

The following two papers came a little later, closer to the realization that victory was coming, that the war would be over, that victory would be taken–probably at the end of 1944 or the beginning of 1945, when position statements were more circumspect than the earlier public opinions.  “Expert Opinion on Post-War Treatment of Japan”  was more understanding when speaking to the post-war existence of Japan, stating in a number of different ways that “there should be no attempt to keep Japan permanently repressed” and “the Japanese people must work out their own political salvation”.  Also that there would be no “continuing burden of reparations payments…as done with Germany after the last war”. 

The overall feeling of this and the following document (“The Treatment of Japan”) can be found in the section “Teaching Japan a Lesson”:  “United Nations effort should be directed toward demonstrating to the people of Japan the advantages of making peace rather than the penalties of losing a war”.  The issue regarding the Emperor and whether or not he should or could stay–an issue that would stay with high command right through the second week of August 1945. 

Arnold Brecht. The Structure of Postwar Germany.

11″x 8.5″, offset printed from typed originals, 13 lvs, Provenance: Librarian’s Office, Library of Congress.  VG copy.  Scarce. $250

• (“Arnold Brecht (January 26, 1884 – September 11, 1977) was a German jurist and one of the leading government officials in the Weimar Republic. He was one of the few democratically minded high-placed officials that opposed the Machtergreifung in 1933. An alumnus of the University of Göttingen, Brecht served as a government official from 1918 to 1933. He was dismissed from his post shortly after the Nazi seizure of power, and emigrated to the United States. He became a lecturer at The New School, and also a foreign policy adviser to the United States government. After World War II he returned to Germany and helped drafting the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany. In 1959 he received the Federal Cross of Merit. Brecht also made contributions to political science. Brecht’s law is the academic basis for one of the components of the equalization payments between the states of Germany.”–Wikipedia)

Announcement of the Final Surrenders of Japanese Troops including Gen Yamashita

Headquarters, United States Army Forces Western Pacific (AFWESPAC HQ), Manila

General Release, APO 707, 25 September 1945. 13” x8”, 2 lvs, 3pp, approximately 500 words. Offset printed. Document produced by the Public Relations Office. Tinted on newsprint, stapled. Good copy of a rare document. $750

This document contains two reports of what were among the very last surrenders of sizable numbers of Japanese troops.

General Release 45 (in two parts)

[First] Surrender of Japanese forces on Negros Island to troops of the 503d Parachute Infantry…

and

[Second] Surrender of 40,000-70,000 Japanese forces (under command of General Yamashita)…

[First] :Surrender of Lt. Gen. Kono, first meeting on 22 August to arrange with the 503d for final surrender. Surrender continued to 30 Aug to include Kono himself to Lt. Col Joe S. Lawrie, 1,600 troops accompanied Kono. From 30 August to the posting date in September more than 5,900 Japanese troops surrendered. As of that date, “only one group of approximately 6090 Japanese remains to surrender”.

Following the surrender details were two paragraphs of a short history of the 503 Parachute Regimental Combat team, or PRCT) operations during the war, winding up to the 16 Feb 1945 deployment to Corregidor,(campaign from 16-26 February) in an attempt to recapture the Bantaan Peninsula, where they inflicted 10,000 Japanese fatalities. (The totals on this campaign varying from about 6,600 Japanese soldiers killed to 10,00; it seems as though the U.S. Suffered 207 killed.)

[Second]

Surrender of more than 40,000 Japanese troops to American forces on Luzon on 19 September to Maj. Gen. Robert S. Beightler (Commanding General, Luzon Area Command). The commander of the Japanese troops was the infamous General Yamashita. The total number of surrenders included about 70,000 troops, including dozens of generals and admirals. Yamashita faced war crime charges and was executed for his terrible crimes over the years.

It was determined that the Japanese forces had no U.S. Or Allied prisoners—interrogations provided that the claim the POWs were earlier sent to Japan was shown to be false, and that the prisoners had probably been murdered.

Another issue was protecting the surrendered Japanese from Philippine civilians, who in the past sought revenge on their oppressors.