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Category: Atomic and Nuclear weapons

  • The Birth of the “Internet” at the End of WWII: Vannevar Bush & the MEMEX, July 1945

    JF Ptak Science Books LLC  Post 190

    Dsc00022 In the midst of running the American scientific war effort (As Director
    of the Office of Scientific Research in charge of some 6000 scientists)
    and in the middle of trying to figure out the best way of dealing with
    the coming proliferation of atomic weapons, Vannevar Bush somehow found
    the time to write what many consider to be the first scientific paper
    on what would become the internet. The paper,   “As We May Think”;  was
    published in the Atlantic Monthly in July 1945.

    (It might be odd to look at it this way, but if you were a Nazi time traveler able to assassinate three people in the U.S. that would change the direction of the American effort in WWII, one would certainly be Roosevelt (who rose to the tasks of the Depression and the War  with Lincolnian sustainability), and I’m not unconvinced that one f the other two might very well be Bush–he kept the scientific agenda on course, direct, and to the point, saving time, effort and lives.  Its an interesting bit to think about….)

    Bush was doing A LOT of thinking on the organization of thought in that year.  I suspect that in trying to deal with the problems of the coming atomic arms race (beginning in the year before Trinity) and in trying to figure out how to distribute the knowledge-base that lead to the building of the bomb, that the idea of the MEMEX may very well have been the future consequence formed by his immediate concerns.

    The MEMEX (Mechanical Aid to Memory) was Bush’s breathtaking idea for a design for the organization of associative thought and memory.  It was a mechanical “aid” to memory, building “trails” of associations of ideas.  The MEMEX was another in the long line of art-of-memory attempts, from the ancients to the memory palaces and theaters of Raymond Lull and Francis Bacon and Athanasius Kircher and Giulio Camillo. What made this so appealing to the next generation of thinker on the distribution of information in the computer age was its ideas on making massive amounts of information obtainable; it was more about *thinking* about order and ability and access to information (in quantities unthinkable and by means unknowable) in 1945. 

    Looking at the future square in the face, Bush writes (on page eight of his short paper) with extraordinary perception: 

    “Wholly new forms of encyclopedias will appear, ready-made with a
    mesh of associative trails running through them, ready to be dropped
    into the memex and there amplified. The lawyer has at his touch the
    associated opinions and decisions of his whole experience, and of the
    experience of friends and authorities. The patent attorney has on call
    the millions of issued patents, with familiar trails to every point of
    his client’s interest. The physician, puzzled by its patient’s
    reactions, strikes the trail established in studying an earlier similar
    case, and runs rapidly through analogous case histories, with side
    references to the classics for the pertinent anatomy and histology. The
    chemist, struggling with the synthesis of an organic compound, has all
    the chemical literature before him in his laboratory, with trails
    following the analogies of compounds, and side trails to their physical
    and chemical behavior.

    “The historian, with a vast chronological account of a people,
    parallels it with a skip trail which stops only at the salient items,
    and can follow at any time contemporary trails which lead him all over
    civilization at a particular epoch. There is a new profession of trail
    blazers, those who find delight in the task of establishing useful
    trails through the enormous mass of the common record. The inheritance
    from the master becomes, not only his additions to the world’s record,
    but for his disciples the entire scaffolding by which they were erected.”

    Sounds pretty familiar, yes? 

    Some of the great internet developers who have recognized the
    importance of this paper by Bush include Doug Englebart, (who would
    write to Bush acknowledging the influence Bush’s article had had on his
    own work. (Zachary, 267).);  J.C.R. Liklider  (Waldrop, 2000): and Ted
    Nelson (Internet pioneer and coiner of the term hypertext and know as
    “one of the most influential contrarians in the history of the
    information age.” (Edwards, 1997)).  And of course many, many others. 

    The full text of the paper “As We May Think” is below.


  • How to use the Atomic Bomb: Revisitng the Chicago Metal Lab Poll, 1945–Results of 2000+ responses

    JF Ptak Science Books LLC  Post 215

    HOW TO USE THE BOMB Poll, 1945–Results

    The results so far (August 23, 2008) from our Post re-offering the Chicago Metallurgical Lab’s poll of July 1945 shows the results from 1945 and 2008 to be quite similar.  Check the results for this day HERE.

    Overall the results are fairly similar—of course there were no controls in the 2008 poll, and it was taken by more than just the scientists at Chicago who helped build the bomb in 1945, and of course people were asked to try and place themselves with some judiciousness back into 1945.  So the results are necessarily problematic.  Even so, I’m not sure right now how to interpret them.

    The result with the greatest difference between 1945 and now was option#1—drop the bomb, drop it now, and drop it on a military target.  There were almost twice the percentage of people in ’08 who chose this than in 1945.  I’m not sure if I’m surprised by this or not—people today certainly know and probably could not put out f their mind that the Japanese didn’t surrender until days after the dropping of the Nagasaki bomb.  Wouldn’t this mean that more people would think to drop it?

    The second option, which frankly I thought would be the overwhelming choice in ’08 (the demonstration of the effectiveness of the bomb), increased somewhat by 25% to 46%.  I was thinking that this number would increase to 75%.  I would guess, though, that if the general public was given this poll (somehow) in 1945, that the overwhelming response would be option #1. After all there were millions of Americans in uniform and the threat of the invasion of Japan was tremendous.  My suspicion is that this number would be gigantic, 90% or something like that, because by this point the country was swimming in reports of terror and blood and death, and that the chance of ending it all in one or two steps would have been almost completely irresistible   remember:  no major decision-maker in the U.S. government had any reservations about the military use of the bomb.  There were private reservations on the use of the bomb among America’s top military men (Eisenhower, for one), but these men would not make the ultimate decision.
    This is a curious result that I need to think about some more.

    The results as of 23 August 2008:

    2008 poll takers=  2082 people.
    1945 poll takers=    150 people

    1. Use them in the manner that is from the military point of view most effective in bringing about prompt Japanese surrender at minimum human cost to our armed forces:  26%   (1945=15%)

    2. Give a military demonstration in Japan to be followed by renewed opportunity for surrender before full use of the weapon is employed  .  37%  (1945=46%)

    3. Give an experimental demonstration in this country, with representatives of Japan present; followed by a new opportunity for surrender before full use of the weapon is employed.  23%  (1945=26%)

    4. Withhold military use of the weapons, but make public experimental demonstration of their effectiveness. 10%  (1945=11%)

    5. Maintain as secret as possible all developments of our new weapons and refrain from using them in this war.  5%  (1945=2%)

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  • Atomic Bomb: Operation CORONET, the Japanese Endgame, and the use of the bomb.

    JF Ptak Science Books LLC  Post 198

    Not to be overlooked in this thread on the decision to use the atomic bomb was the long and deadly end-game to the Pacific War planned in pre-use atomic times.  The fact of the matter was that semi-defeated Japan (former Prime Minister Konoye told the Emperor privately in February 1945, “I think there is no longer any doubt about our defeat”), was still not remotely close to surrendering, or at least not abiding the possibility of unconditional surrender, in July 1945.

    The U.S. plans for the final push on Japan began to form in 1944.  It was a massive and complex operation, which was to begin in November 1945, with the aim of subduing the industrial homeland of Honshu, striking a death blow to the teetering ability of the Japanese government to supply civilian goods and metal materiel.  The first stage of the attack was called Operation Olympic, and was to take place at Kyushu; but as large as this attack was it was still preliminary to an ever-more massive Operation Coronet—in all, there was to be a 5-million man combined U.S.-Britain invasion army with the largest air and naval support in the history of warfare.

    “Hell was upon us, when we lost Saipan,” the Chief of the Japanese Naval General Staff told American interrogators shortly after the war. A high-ranking NGS planner explained: “After the Coral Sea and Midway, I still had hope. After Guadalcanal, I felt we could not win, only we would not lose. After the Marianas, we had little chance. After Okinawa, it was all over.”—”Olympic vs. Ketsu-Go”, Marine Corps Gazette, August 1965, vol 49 no 8, by Jack Bauer and Alan Coox.  For the full article see here.

    Whether or not this view was shared with other members of the ruling elite didn’t come into play, as the Japanese high command continued to plan for the defense of the homeland.  There were still 2.3 million Japanese armed forces in the islands (53 infantry divisions and 25 brigades); there was also a 2.25 million force of army workers, 1.3 million Navy workers, and a National Volunteer Militia of 28 million.  There would be a colossal confrontation along the length and breadth of the country of Japan.

    Bauer and Coox continue in their paper (from which I’ll quote at length)
    :
    “The greatest danger to the assault was assumed to come from the air. The Americans expected opposition from 5,000 kamikazes, a realistic estimate in keeping with Japanese plans (KETSU-GO Operation). These called for 5,000 planes to be expended in attacks on the invasion force, whose appearance was expected sometime after September. The Japanese estimated that the assault force would be carried in 1,000 transports and that if half were sunk in the first ten days the landings could be smashed. Using the 1:6 ratio derived from their Okinawa experience, Japanese planners estimated this would require 3,000 planes. They assigned an additional 350 kamikazes to attacks on the carrier forces. The remaining 1,650 included those under repair and lost before the attack. As late as 15 July, however, only 70% of the required planes were in hand so it seems reasonable to assume that aerial opposition would have been less than expected.

    “Covering the Japanese home islands were four ground armies of eight ground divisions (one in Kyushu and five in the Kanto area), plus three brigades, four AAA divisions (with 1200 guns), and 14 cadre divisions.
    “From the outset of 1945 the Japanese High command struggled to improve the defensive posture in the homeland where 2 1/2 million men were supposed to confront an invasion. It was hoped to transfer many troops and munitions home from the Asian continent by autumn, but this task grew more difficult with the acceleration of American assaults, and the consequent decrease in Japanese strength. In January 1945 the first joint Army-Navy operational plan was devised, stressing decisive combat in the homeland but the gaining of time through delaying operations on the periphery, especially Okinawa. Surprise and “special attacks” (a euphemism for suicide assaults) were to be the main points of Japanese strategy. The front line of the heartland perimeter would be southern Kuriles-Bonin-Ryukyus-Taiwan-Shanghai. Operational preparations against American landings would be accomplished in the regions of the Kanto, Kyushu, Eastern Sea (Tokai), and South Korea. Particular emphasis would be ascribed to air defense of these districts and the Osaka-Kobe (Hanshin) section. Every effort would be made to destroy the attackers while they were still in the water, in the main battle theater of the Pacific and the East China Sea.

    “Immense manpower levies were to be raised, on the basis of the new operational plans, within a few months: 56 divisions, 38 brigades, etc.-involving between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000 new men…with 450,000 men on Kyushu with 220,000 of those (including five field divisions) south of the line Minamata-Nabeoka. An additional three or four divisions were believed available in the northern part of Kyushu as reinforcements while a small additional force could be committed from Honshu. Intelligence estimates, however, predicted that few troops would be committed from Honshu in order to conserve them for the defense of the main island.

    “By March 1945 the General Staff had completed an outline for the defense operations (coded as KETSU-GO). All homeland area armies were directed to send their chiefs of staff and key officers to examine the draft informally in Tokyo. Exploiting the terrain of the home islands, and exhorting the fighting spirit and cooperation of the 100 million Imperial subjects, all Navy and Air Force remnants were to tackle the special-attack mission of destroying enemy forces while still at sea. But since Japanese naval power was almost destroyed, and the air units were so weak, homeland ground formations (deployed in depth and massed in decisive battle sectors) would take the offensive against enemy troops who managed to land, and would “recoup in one stroke the declining fate of the Nation.”

    I mean to point out in all of this that the business of attacking Japan would have been a spectacularly costly and monumental military step, and that his was the major thought in the minds of the American decision makers so far as the military use of the atomic bomb was concerned.  Truman had all of this in his head when he authorized the use of the bomb—most of all I am sure he had the hypothesized American casualty reports for these operations, which numbered in the hundreds of thousands and above.  The one thing that all of the major decision makers had in their minds at this time, in July 1945, was that the bomb would somehow be employed, one way or another.  I’m not aware of any major player having any other thought in his head at this time.  (John McCloy was one, but as Asst Secretary of State, he wasn’t a major figure.)  So, when one is thinking about The Decision, one certainly has to be aware of the non-bomb, non-surrender military aspect of ending the war, and this is one part of it. (There were some half-million Purple Heart medals made for this invasion in 1945–these Purple Hearts were subsequently awarded to  the casualties of the Korean War and through most of the Vietnam War until the 1945 medals were depleted.)

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  • Atomic Bomb: William Shockley and the Economics of Using the Atomic Bomb, 1945

    JF Ptak Science Books LLC Post 195   

    • Background Documents on the Control and Proliferation Issues of the Atomic Bomb
    • Vannevar Bush Group, October 1945-January 1946
    • Paper 1:  William Shockley

    Blogaug_6shockley_1361 (Click image to enlarge; the other four pages are located in the “Continue Reading” section, below.)
    William Shockley on the Economics of the “Atomic Bomb Art”

    This paper is one a small archive of background and draft papers and proposals by the Vannevar Bush group working on the question of the control of atomic weapons and the formalization of the American position regarding the use and control of atomic weapons, October 1945-February 1946. This archive consists of 38 documents relating to the development of U.S. atomic policy, with  contributions by President Harry Truman, Secretary of State James Byrnes, Dr. Vannevar Bush, (future AEC director) Carroll Wilson, Alger Hiss, I.I. Rabi, William Shockley, Frederick Dunn, Joseph E. Johnson, Leo Pasvolsky, Philip Morrison, Col. Nichols, William McRae, Admiral W.H.P. Blandy, George L. Harrison, and others.

    I have written elsewhere on this site about Vannevar Bush and the coming atomic/nuclear arms problem–as perhaps one of the pre-eminent scientific minds in the Roosevelt/Truman administrations, Bush and others foresaw the development of the atomic arms race in 1943, and by 1945 Bush became a  fundamental thinker and advocate on the problem. The items in this archive are low-formal background papers, drafts of proposals, informal studies, as well as mature statements of thought that would become implemented in the core of U.S. policy regarding the spread and control of atomic weapons. They are generally carbon typescripts and necessarily of extremely limited distribution, generally have no letterheads, occasionally carry the authors’ full names (although sometimes only initials are used).

    A note on William Shockley
    . The brilliant Shockley’s story is difficult and problematic: from the way in which he misused his interaction with the rest of his team at Bell Labs in the discovery of the junction transistor to his sinful racial and eugenic (and dysgenic) public persona later in life–it is a hard and long one to tell, and I’ll not try to do it here.  Suffice to say that I’m very aware of the very long shadows, and I think that other people should at least be aware of them as well, regardless of the staggering importance of “his” (with the wonderful Walter Brattain and John Bardeen) monumental discovery.  

    The William Shockley paper was written towards the end of 1945 and is on five pages and runs about 1500 words.  He begins the paper with a logical statement of the issue of the economics of conventional and atomic bombing, ending with the sentence “For atomic bombing destruction is still more cheap”.  What Shockley is getting to is the overall cost of the amount of destruction caused per square mile, and the conclusion that he draws over these five pages is the destruction caused by the atomic bomb is 1/100th the cost of conventional bombing per square mile destroyed (“atomic bombing is probably 10 to 100 times cheaper than ordinary bombing”).   

    Shockley also recognizes that the problem in the near future will be the increasing cheapness of producing atomic (and greater) weapons, and their developing accessibility to small nations.  “This cheapness is a new factor and indicates that an unparalleled loss of human resources will accompany future wars.  The ability of small nations to do great damage is also a consequence of the cheapness.”  He writes further that taking this thinking to its “logical conclusion”, that at some point in the future a single individual will be able to use this new technology to destroy the world.  The main point though that he was making in this line of thinking was the dispersion and proliferation of the new technology–that an arms race would occur, and that it would be dangerous, and that it could be very very bad.  Shockley has of course nothing to say about any of that or the implications of his finds as that was not his charge. 

    After figuring that the cost of destruction by the atomic bomb was about $600,000 per square mile (compared to $6,500,000 per square mile for conventional bombing), Shockley concludes that “since the atomic bomb art is in its infancy, we may well expect future economies of a factor of 10 in cost per square mile destroyed…”

    Shockley on the likelihood of casualties during the final invasion of
    Japan.
     

    (The following three paragraphs are taken entirely from
    CASUALTY PROJECTIONS FOR THE U.S. INVASIONS OF JAPAN, 1945-1946:
    PLANNING AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS by D. M. Giangreco in the Journal of
    Military History, 61 (July 1997): 521-82 

    “As for Dr. Shockley’s initial report to Dr. Bowles, it was not
    submitted until after Stimson had left for Potsdam. He proposed that a
    study be initiated “to determine to what extent the behavior of a
    nation in war can be predicted from the behavior of her troops in
    individual battles.” Shockley utilized the analyses of Dr. DeBakey and
    Dr. Beebe, and discussed the matter in depth with Professor Quincy
    Wright from the University of Chicago, author of the highly-respected A
    Study of War; and Colonel James McCormack, Jr., a Military Intelligence
    officer and former Rhodes Scholar who served ! in the OPD’s small but
    influential Strategic Policy Section with another former Rhodes
    Scholar, Colonel Dean Rusk. Shockley said:

    “If the study shows that the behavior of nations in all historical
    cases comparable to Japan’s has in fact been invariably consistent with
    the behavior of the troops in battle, then it means that the Japanese
    dead and ineffectives at the time of the defeat will exceed the
    corresponding number for the Germans. In other words, we shall probably
    have to kill at least 5 to 10 million Japanese. This might cost us
    between 1.7 and 4 million casualties including [between] 400,000 and
    800,000 killed.”–W. B. Shockley to Edward L. Bowles, 21 July 1945, “Proposal for
    Increasing the Scope of Casualties Studies,” Edward L. Bowles Papers,
    box 34, Library of Congress. … No accurate total of German military and civilian deaths was
    available at the time he prepared his report, but the number was
    eventually set at roughly 11,000,000. was not invaded and finished the
    war with just over 7,000,000 casualties, most of them from its armed
    services on the Asian mainland in fighting from September 1931 to
    September 1945.

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  • On the Atomic Bomb: 16 July-9 August, 1945

    I’ve made a number of posts recently relating to the building of and the decision to use the atomic bomb, from the Trinity Test to the Nagasaki bomb, 16 July-9 August, as we are in that time of year when all of this happened, 63 years ago.  To look at all of these post, click here.  Beginning on 6th August I will begin posting a series of 38 documents  (written in 1945 and early 1946) from the Vannevar Bush group tasked with the problem of  the coming proliferation of atomic weapons.  As far as I can determine NONE of these documents have ever been published. The first of these papers to be presented is by William Shockley (nobelist and highly problematic late-life thinker) on the Economics of the Atomic Bomb (1945).

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  • Atomic Bomb, 1 August 1945: Stimson on the Publication of the Smyth Report

    JF Ptak Science Books LLC  Post 188

    Secretary of War Henry Stimson’s Diary Entry for 1 August 1945, centering on the publication of Henry DeWolf Smyth’s history of the Manhattan Project (bold is by me as are any statements made between [ ] ):

    Smyth_2
    August 1, 1945
    “As soon as I arrived at the Department I called in General Marshall and asked him whether he had received my message through McCarthy and he told me that he had and that the speech had been changed and made in an entirely different form.”

    “I then took up with Harrison, Bundy and Groves the third paper to be issued in S-1, namely that of the scientists.  The draft of this paper [Henry DeWolf Smyth’s A general account of the development of methods of using atomic energy for military purposes, which would be known later in the year as  Atomic Energy for Military Purposes, 1945, and then more generally and unofficially as the Smyth Report]  is about two hundred pages long – manifestly so big that I cannot possibly read it now, and I therefore went over the skeleton of it and the pros and cons of making any speech (as to which I am very doubtful) with my three consultants. The aim of the paper is to backfire reckless statements by independent scientists after the demonstration of the bomb. If we could be sure that these could be controlled and avoided, all of us would much prefer not to issue such a paper. But under the circumstances of the entire independence of action of scientists and the certainty that there would be a tremendous amount of excitement and reckless statement, Groves, who is a very conservative man, had reached the conclusion that the lesser evil would be for us to make a statement carefully prepared so as not to give away anything vital and thus try to take the stage away from the others. We debated long over the situation for it is a very difficult question and all of us recognize its difficulty. Rules have been drawn under which this present paper has been formulated. I went over those rules and then postponed the matter until tomorrow when I shall have a talk with Conant, Groves, Bundy, and some of Groves’ assistants on the whole matter. I am of course much influenced by the fact that Groves has reached a decision in favor of the statement.”

    (General Groves I believe recognized the expediency of the report as well in spite of his expectedly ferocious adherence to security protocol—the report, while revealing a lot of data, would also establish the limit of publication of information on the Project and on the bomb.  Overall, it was a smart thing to do, establishing the control of the dialog on the subject of the bomb. It was after all Groves (in 1944) who appointed Smyth to the Richard C. Tolman Committee to make recommendations for the post-war development of atomic energy; Smyth recommended publishing a report on the making of the bomb that would be published soon after it was no longer a secret; Groves concurred.  The report was officially released (in 160,000 copies) on 12 August 1945.)
    Smyth_s1

    S-1 Executive Committee, Manhattan Project,
    September 14, 1942
    l. to r.: Thomas Crenshaw, Robert Oppenheimer, Harold C. Urey, Ernest O. Lawrence, James B. Conant, Lyman J. Briggs, E. V. Murphree, Arthur Compton,  Robert Thornton,  K. D. Nichols
    .

    Picture at top is of Smyth with what looks like the advance copy (the famous “lithoprint” edition).

    Following are the opening paragraphs of the Smyth report from the Preface and Introduction: 

    Preface

    “The ultimate responsibility for our nation’s policy rests on its citizens and they can discharge such responsibilities wisely only if they are informed. The average citizen cannot be expected to understand clearly how an atomic bomb is constructed or how it works but there is in this country a substantial group of engineers and scientists who can understand such things and who can explain their potentialities of atomic bombs to their fellow citizens. The present report is written for this professional group and is a matter-of-fact, general account of work in the USA since 1939 aimed at the production of such bombs. It is neither a documented official history nor a technical treatise for experts. Secrecy requirements have affected both the detailed content and general emphasis so that many interesting developments have been omitted…”

    First Paragraph of the Introduction:

    “1.1. The purpose of this report is to describe the scientific and technical developments in this country since 1940 directed toward the military use of energy from atomic nuclei. Although not written as a “popular” account of the subject, this report is intended to be intelligible to scientists and engineers generally and to other college graduates with a good grounding in physics and chemistry. The equivalence of mass and energy is chosen as the guiding principle in the presentation of the background material of the “Introduction.””

    The full text of the report is located HERE.

     

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  • The Atomic Bomb: the Only Order to Actually Use Nuclear Weapons, 25 July 1945

    JF Ptak Science Books LLC 
    Atomic_bomb_target_selection

    Here are the two basic documents which prepared the actual use of atomic weapons against Japanese targets (written 22 July and 25 July, respectively).    The first was prepared by Colonel John Stone for his superior General of the Army Air Forces Henry H. Hap Arnold, initiated by General George Marshall through General Thomas Handy—updating Arnold on the progress at the Potsdam Conference from which he (Stone)  had just returned.  The next is the only actual signed-off document authorizing the use of nuclear weapons, and comes under the direction of George Marshall’s directive to General Handy:  basically relating that the P{resident had authorized Secretary Stimson who had authorized Marshall to authorize Handy to authorize General Carl Spaatz (Commanding General, U.S. Army Strategic Air Force) to use the weapon. Spaatz is also directed to deliver a copy of the order (“personally”, that is, by hand)  to General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz.
    Source: The National Security Archive

    Atomic_bomb_handy_to_spaatz_1945

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  • The Atomic Bomb: 6 August 1945. Propaganda Leaflet Dropped on Japanese Cities

    JF Ptak Science Books  LLC  Post 186

    These are translations of leaflets that were dropped on Japanese cities in the immediate aftermath of the bombing of Hiroshima (as Nagasaki, which would be bombed three days later on 9 August is not mentioned). Both of these are again from the Harry Truman Presidential Library.  The Japanese did not submit to the demand of unconditional surrender as laid out in Potsdam on 26 July, not did they submit when the Soviet Union declare war, nor did they submit after the 9 August bombing of Nagasaki.  They did finally accept the conditions of unconditional surrender surrender on 15 August, signing away the war two weeks later on the USS Missouri, 2 September 1945.  A third atomic bomb was nearly ready for use by the middle of August.   

    Atomic_bomb_leaflet

    Atomic_bomb_leaflet

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  • The Atomic Bomb, 31 July 1945: Truman’s Statement on the Bombing of Hiroshima

    JF Ptak Science Books LLC  Post 185

    Truman_letter_x

    I’ve made several posts on the development of the first atomic bomb(s) as we approach the anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima (6 August 1945) and Nagasaki (9 August 1945).  At this point in 1945, the Potsdam Declaration had been announced demanding the unconditional surrender of Japan, Little Boy was being assembled, and Fat Man had arrived at Tinian Island.  The last bits of the Manhattan Project were being put into place.  One of public relations parts—the first PR involving the use of the bomb–is a document that I’ve never seen before, found at the Truman Presidential Library (and available digitally). 
    Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War, sent this message to President Truman as the statement to be released by the White House once the (secret) bomb had been dropped (also known as “Use Day”)—an explanation to the American people about what would happen on 6 August.

    Truman_letter_1

    Truman_letter_2

    Truman_letter_3

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  • Trinity at 63: The First Atomic Blast, Alamogordo, July 16, 1945

    JF Ptak Science Books LLC   Post 171

    Trinity
    Now we are all sons of bitches
    —Kenneth Bainbridge, Trinity Director.

    There were many profound thoughts in many profound heads there in the desert, at the reaches of the Jornarda del Muerto (“The Dead Man’s Walk”, a formerly nearly-impenetrable stretch of desert in  the Llano Estacado) at the Trinity Test Site, Alamogordo, New Mexico, on 16 July 1945 for the successful testing of the first atomic bomb.  Robert Oppenheimer famously cited the Gita (“Now I am Become Death, the Destroyer of Worlds…”): Enrico Fermi was so busy with his little and excruciatingly wonderful experiment with strips of paper calculating the effect of the blast (he reckoned a very-close 10,000 tons) that he didn’t actually hear the explosion; Edward Teller thought Tellerian thoughts, and so on.  Actually the observation points (like S-10000 and Campania Hill)were crowded with big brains:  in addition to Oppenheimer, Teller and Fermi were people like Hans Bethe, James Chadwick (whose discovery of the neutron sort of started the whole thing), Richard Feynman, George Kistiakowsky, Phil Morrison, Robert Serber, Vannevar Bush, James Conant, and many others.  The were all thinking pretty big things (except for the occasional if-you-can-believe-it stuff like that which maybe came from Feynman’s mouth, which was “hot dog!”).  I think that Bainbridge’s statement was the best, and truest, summation of the morning’s activities.
    Oppenheimer_groves_090945

    In a strong and inestimable claim to naïve weirdness, Edward Teller—at about 5:00 in the morning, waiting for the explosion with the others—broke out a bottle of sunblock lotion, applying it to his face and hands.  The bottle was passed around and was used by others. I can not imagine what must’ve been going through the mind of any observer watching these scientists prepare themselves for the blast, except perhaps for “oh, s___”). 

    Just about everyone wrote of the moment in their memoirs or reflections, and I’ve read a lot of them; the description that stands out from the others to my mind, the one that put an understandable spin on an untranslatable moment, belonged to the ueber-literate Morrison.  He wrote that although the flash and the brightness were stupendous, there was something else that was more astonishing—that was the blast of heat from the shock wave that he felt on his face in the cold desert morning. He was 10 miles away from Zero, and in those few moments when the scientists had recreated the birth of the universe, he was an epoch in time away from the 32 simultaneous detonations that set the bomb off 5:29:45 am. 

    At almost the same moment as the blast, Little Boy shipped out on the Indianapolis (which would encounter its own horrific date with the future on her return trip) from Hunter’s Point Naval Shipyard at San Francisco.

    Everyone who knew about the bomb that day knew that the war was over.  The question of course how to make it so. 
    Hiroshima_aftermath

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